


Theorising Climate Change and Migration: Affect, Politics and the Future Conditional



Andrew Baldwin

About Insights

Insights captures the ideas and work-in-progress of the Fellows of the Institute of Advanced Study at Durham University. Up to twenty distinguished and ‘fast-track’ Fellows reside at the IAS in any academic year. They are world-class scholars who come to Durham to participate in a variety of events around a core inter-disciplinary theme, which changes from year to year. Each theme inspires a new series of *Insights*, and these are listed in the inside back cover of each issue. These short papers take the form of thought experiments, summaries of research findings, theoretical statements, original reviews, and occasionally more fully worked treatises. Every fellow who visits the IAS is asked to write for this series. The Directors of the IAS – Veronica Strang, Rob Barton, Nicholas Saul and Chris Greenwell – also invite submissions from others involved in the themes, events and activities of the IAS. *Insights* is edited for the IAS by Nicholas Saul. Previous editors of *Insights* were Professor Susan Smith (2006–2009), Professor Michael O’Neill (2009–2012) and Professor Barbara Graziosi (2012–2015).

About the Institute of Advanced Study

The Institute of Advanced Study, launched in October 2006 to commemorate Durham University’s 175th Anniversary, is a flagship project reaffirming the value of ideas and the public role of universities. The Institute aims to cultivate new thinking on ideas that might change the world, through unconstrained dialogue between the disciplines as well as interaction between scholars, intellectuals and public figures of world standing from a variety of backgrounds and countries. The Durham IAS is one of only a handful of comparable institutions in the world that incorporates the Sciences, Social Sciences, the Arts and the Humanities.

The focal point of the IAS is a programme of work associated with, but not exclusive to, an annual research theme. At the core of this work lies a prestigious Fellowship programme. This programme gathers together scholars, intellectuals and public figures of world standing or world-promise to address topics of major academic or public interest. Their mission is to anticipate the new and re-interpret the old, communicating across and working between disciplinary boundaries.

Every year, the Institute invites as many as twenty highly creative individuals to spend up to three months in Durham. They are located in Cosin’s Hall, a magnificent and spacious 18th century mansion which, together with Durham Cathedral and Durham Castle, forms part of Palace Green, dominating the World Heritage Site of Durham Peninsula. During their stay, Fellows engage with departments and colleges, deliver public lectures and seminars, and, above all, join an international community of researchers to address the theme selected for that year. Further details of the IAS and its Fellowship programme can be found at www.durham.ac.uk/ias/fellows

Copyright

The design and contents of *Insights* are subject to copyright. Copyright and Reproduction Rights in all submitted contributions remain with the authors, as described in the Author’s Copyright Agreement. Copyright and Reproduction Rights of all other material remain with *Insights*.

Except under the terms of Fair Dealing (UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988), the user may not modify, copy, reproduce, retransmit or otherwise distribute the site and its contents (whether text, graphics or original research concepts), without express permission in writing from the Institute. Where the above content is directly or indirectly reproduced in an academic context under the terms of Fair Dealing, this must be acknowledged with the appropriate bibliographical citation.

The opinions stated in the *Insights* papers are those of their respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University, or the staff and students thereof.

THEORISING CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: AFFECT, POLITICS AND THE FUTURE CONDITIONAL

Climate change is more and more being imagined as a problem of migration. Much of this imagining of climate change is predicated on the idea that climate change will proliferate migration around the world, resulting in either a greater number of humanitarian crises and/or wars. This paper argues against this thesis, and instead claims that the contemporary discourse on climate change and migration is a means of governing how mostly 'Western' audiences relate to climate change. The claim is that the discourse on climate change and migration is Eurocentric and thus more concerned with recentring Europe as the agent of historical modernity, than with saving the imperilled other of climate change. A set of new concepts is offered that help us better understand the politics of climate change and migration: threshold, social tense, dehumanisation and geographies of potential.



The politics of climate change and human migration are wildly misunderstood. Human migration and climate change pose two of the greatest political challenges of our time. Migration is, of course, fundamental to human life and economy, and yet it remains the subject of much antipathy around the world. Meanwhile, climate change is said to threaten the very biophysical conditions that make modern life and economy possible. It is said to pose such drastic consequences for how we live our lives *in situ* that drastic measures are required if we are to avert or even live with its consequences. But when climate change and human migration are imagined together, the image that often comes to mind is one of mass migration from the Global South to Europe or the West, or of millions of destitute 'climate refugees'. Both images, which often appear in media and political rhetoric, are deeply fraught. In this short paper, I offer some insights that can help us think climate change and human migration in less apocalyptic ways.

There are two dominant epistemological frameworks that researchers use to make sense of the relation between climate change and migration: empiricism and governance. To understand this relation empirically typically means identifying a range of climate change impacts – sea-level rise, drought, extreme weather events – and then evaluating how and with what consequences these impacts affect peoples' migration decisions. In this empirical sense, researchers want to know how a changing climate might cause or trigger human migration, for example, by ascertaining the causal dynamics between climate change and the migration decisions of individuals and households. To understand this relation as a governance problem would mean implementing measures to ensure that the migration effects of climate change do not have adverse effect on things like household economies or territorial sovereignty. In this normative sense, researchers are interested in understanding how the relation between climate change and migration might be governed. For example, some want to know what kind of human rights regime might be required to safeguard the human rights of people forced to relocate as a consequence of climate change. A good example of this is the Nansen Initiative, which sought to develop a protection agenda in support of migrants forced to cross an international boundary as a result of environmental hazards, including climate change. Or in more extreme cases, researchers want to know what kinds of security measures ought to be taken to manage this phenomenon.

But even while these two frameworks are less likely to grab the headlines than images of mass migration or humanitarian crises, they too are problematic insofar as both presume in advance that 'climate change and migration' is an actually existing phenomenon. This paper interprets the relationship between climate change and migration against the grain of these two dominant frameworks. In this interpretative sense, it approaches climate change and migration not as a problem to be solved but as an object to be explained. However, whereas the empirical and governance frameworks tend to treat this relation as politically neutral and objective, this paper approaches the relationship between climate change and migration as one saturated in power and politics. Rather than trying to understand how this relation ought to be governed as an object of public policy or law, it is more concerned with understanding what this relation can tell us about ourselves.

The argument presented here is that the contemporary *discourse* on climate change and migration is a means of governing our relationship to climate change and by 'our' I refer to those of us who live in Europe or the West. Or, more simply, the discourse on climate change and migration is rather Eurocentric, more concerned with recentring Europe as the agent of historical modernity, than with saving the imperilled other of climate change, i.e. the so-called climate refugee (Baldwin, 2017a). The argument is built upon three closely related concepts: threshold, dehumanisation and geographies of potential. The first concept – threshold – refers to a space-time between present and future. Here, the story I want to tell is that the figure of the human – the protagonist in the discourse on climate change and migration – is forged at the threshold of the actual world and a world that is yet to come. At play in the threshold is what the anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli calls 'the tense of the other' (Povinelli, 2011, p. 43). Also at play here is the way that social tense produces the human through a kind of affective orientation to the future. The second concept concerns the idea of dehumanisation. This is a process by which some human beings come to be devalued, and in our story dehumanisation hinges principally on the way in which the figure of the climate change migrant (or climate refugee) is pushed into a future-posterior time and thus comes to occupy a space of indeterminacy where it is figured as undecidable and ambiguous, even monstrous (Baldwin, 2017b). And with the final concept – geographies of potential – I draw together the concepts of threshold and dehumanisation to tell a story about the kind of geographical imagination that is consolidated by the discourse on climate change and migration.

Background

It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when and how migration first emerged as an element in climate change discourse. Some trace the origin of the discourse on climate change-induced migration, or climate refugees, to the concept of 'climate security' which began circulating in the early 2000s. In a 2003 report commissioned by the US Pentagon, the argument was made that climate change represented an unfolding national security issue for the United States, an argument predicated on the claim that climate change will result in mass migration, which will in turn catalyse various forms of political violence (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). This is a very typical claim that one finds in the climate security literature. It was repeated, for example, in 2007 when the UN Security Council debated climate change for the first time. But the place of migration in climate change discourse can also be traced to a series of humanitarian arguments that emerged during roughly the same period (Conisbee and Sims, 2003). In such accounts, the climate refugee is commonly figured as a victim of or vulnerable to climate change, and one of the central themes in such accounts is that the climate refugee is a figure at risk of losing his or her human-rights protections as a result of having to relocate because of climate change. Now taken together both of these accounts – the climate migrant as the catalyst for political

violence or the climate migrant (or refugee) as victim – pose the figure of the migrant as lacking in political agency.

In recent years, however, a new epistemic community has begun to take shape which challenges the conventional assumption that migration in the context of climate change will result in either violence or humanitarian strife. Based on the principles of human security and from socioecological systems theory, the main contention of this community is that migration is a legitimate adaptive response to climate change (Gemenne, 2011; McLeman and Hunter, 2010). Elsewhere I have referred to this narrative as the ‘migration-as-adaptation thesis’ (Baldwin, 2017c), a good example of which can be found in a report published by UK Foresight in 2011 on *Migration and Global Environmental Change*. It also featured in the recently published *Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2014). Two further issues concerning the relation between human mobility and climate change warrant mention. The first concerns the issue of definition and terminology, and the second the issue of causality. In regards to definition and terminology, the most important thing to point out is that, at present, there is no agreed definition about what kinds of migration or displacement qualify as climate change migration or displacement. In effect this is a phenomenon that lacks a corresponding definition or shared terminology. And this leads immediately to the second issue, the issue of causality, whether and how climate change *causes* migration. It is now common practice for those working with the discourse on climate change and migration to distance themselves from the language of causal determinism or, in today’s language, reductionism (Baldwin and Bettini, 2017). Instead it is far more common to see researchers and policy makers describe climate change and migration as a complex and irreducible problem. Some even now describe it as emergent and non-linear (Black et al., 2011).

This distancing from causal determinism is for at least two reasons. First, causal determinism resembles the early twentieth-century environmental determinism which underwrote much early twentieth-century racism. And the second reason is that there is no evidence that climate change *causes* migration. Too many other intervening factors can also explain human migration. Labour markets, unequal land tenure, war and civil conflict are all structural conditions that bear directly on migration decisions. Place attachment, household dynamics and microeconomics are also significant (Adams, 2015). To argue that climate change causes migration simply negates or downplays these other important considerations. And it is here where things start to get really interesting. This absent causality *also* suggests that signifiers like *climate migrant* or *climate refugee* appear to have no underlying referent, no *actual* set of underlying material relations to which they refer. And so, here we might be tempted to argue that in the absence of an actual referent, signifiers like *climate migrant* or *climate refugee* might best be understood as *empty* signifiers, concepts with no inherent meaning. This is a tempting argument but it is also somewhat misleading. This is because even though these signifiers appear to have no *actual* content, they are in fact full of *virtual* content which is to say that signifiers like *climate migrant* or *climate refugee* are made to designate a whole range of virtual possibilities. And by virtual, I borrow from Gilles Deleuze’s idea that the virtual is something that is real but *not* actual (Deleuze, 1994; Shields, 2003). Examples of the virtual include things like digital space (as in virtual reality), avatars, memory, aspirations, but also speculations about the future. In fact, when you first begin to read the climate change and migration discourse, one thing that will immediately jump out at you is that it is written almost exclusively in the future-conditional tense (Baldwin, 2013). The discourse names a set of future contingencies. Thus climate change and migration is not an empty signifier. It is not a concept without content, nor a concept without referent. It is, I would argue, best conceived as virtual. It is not at all unreasonable to assume that climate change will affect migration at some point in the future. It is just that we

are not able to identify this phenomenon as an actually-occurring phenomenon. Instead all we are left with is the language of virtuality.

The Argument

Let me turn now to the argument, the idea that the discourse of climate change and migration functions as a technology of governance that is foremost about bringing stability to the human at the very moment when the crisis of climate change threatens the very idea and stability of the human. In short, my argument is that the discourse functions to shore up the human at the moment that the crisis of climate change and the crisis of humanism converge. And here let me offer some rather hasty additional definitions. By human, I refer to the human as an agent of reason, one whose self-awareness and cognition is said to be internal to itself. The human is the figure imagined to possess historical agency sufficient to transform and modernise both social relations and nature. And by crisis of humanism, I am referring to the dawning awareness that the figure of the human as an internally coherent subject is no longer tenable, if it ever was. The concept of the Anthropocene makes the crisis of humanism all too evident.

Threshold

As mentioned earlier, the threshold refers to a liminal space-time between present and future, between actual and virtual worlds. And, as a concept, it is important to us because the relation between climate change and migration occupies this liminal space-time of the threshold. It is in the threshold that the figure of the human specific to the relation takes shape. In order to describe how this taking shape occurs, what I would like to emphasise is the role that social tense plays in constituting the human at the centre of the discourse. Social tense is a concept that I take from Elizabeth Povinelli who uses it to describe the way in which social identities come to rely on time as a means for self-definition (2011). Povinelli develops her idea of social tense in the context of settler colonialism in Australia, where she describes the settler citizen as occupying the space of the present and how the space of the present only comes into effect in relation to the figure of indigeneity and the figure of the immigrant, both of which are made to occupy two distinctive space-times in relation to the settler citizen. The figure of indigeneity is relegated to the past where it is equated with notions of tradition and prior occupancy. And the figure of the immigrant is given a kind of future status. The settler citizen imagines him- or herself in relation to the foreigner who was not here prior to the settler's arrival. Rather, the immigrant's presence within the national space only came about after the arrival of the settler, and the immigrant is also the one who will continue to arrive in the settler colony as the future unfolds.

Importantly, for Povinelli, social tense should be understood as a technology of power inasmuch as it is central to the way in which the settler imagines his or her occupancy of the space of the nation. By occupying the present, the very centre of time, the settler is in a position to orchestrate and organise difference within the space of the nation. For the purpose of this paper, social tense is a useful concept for understanding the human agent imagined at the centre of climate change and migration discourse. And, of course, of particular relevance here is the future tense. The human at the centre of climate change and migration discourse imagines its agency in relation to the future. This is an agency that seeks to make arrangements for the future, an agency that puts in place a kind of management regime suitable for managing the future when it arrives.

Dehumanisation

As also mentioned earlier, dehumanisation is a process that devalues some people over others by positioning the devalued person outside the category of the human. In the discourse on climate change and migration, dehumanisation occurs when people are displaced into a space of indeterminacy, a future-posterior space-time where people come to be understood as ambiguous, undecidable and monstrous. What is this space of indeterminacy? It is, effectively, a space of non-recognition that coincides with the threshold. And we can locate this space at a number of moments in the discourse. In political discourse, the figure of the climate change migrant enters the space of indeterminacy when it is conceived as the excess of political categorisation (Baldwin, 2013), a space in which the political status of the figure is suspended. People are imagined into a kind of non-legal space in which they have no rights. A good example of this is found in instances when Pacific Islanders are imagined as climate refugees. The Australian geographers, Karen McNamara and Chris Gibson (2009) have shown how the UN ambassadors of Pacific small islands refuse the terminology of climate refugee largely because the term is a denial of islander agency. But also because to accept the terminology of climate refugee as a descriptor for those they represent would be to position these citizens into an indeterminate legal space, into a non-legal category for which there is no corresponding legal definition and no corresponding set of rights and responsibilities. In this sense, to accept the label climate refugee would be tantamount to forfeiting the moral and legal duty that diplomats have for the citizens they represent.

We can also locate this space of indeterminacy in various empirical moments in the discourse in which the figure of climate change migrant is, very simply, unknowable. For example, it is now quite fashionable for academics and practitioners to refuse quantitative prediction as an empirical method for predicting the number of people who will migrate because of climate change. In the absence of an agreed definition of what counts as climate migration, quantitative prediction is simply not possible. And so here we might conceptualise the climate migrant as the excess of calculation. Or we might even conceptualise the climate migrant as the excess of knowledge itself. For example, as I mentioned earlier, it is now commonplace across the academic and policy discussion on climate change and migration to acknowledge the impossibility of explaining migration solely in relation to climate change. Too many other variables can also explain migration decisions. And here I would argue the figure of the climate change bears strong resemblance to the absolute (Baldwin, 2014). Jane Bennett (2010) describes the absolute as something that 'no speaker could possibly see, that is, a some-thing that is not an object of knowledge, that is detached or radically free from representation, and thus no-thing at all. Nothing but the force or effectivity of the detachment' (p. 3). She goes on to describe the absolute as an 'epistemological limit', something that 'refuses to dissolve completely into the milieu of human knowledge' (p. 3). I would suggest that when the concept of the climate migrant or the climate refugee is invoked to describe people, such people are being positioned beyond the limit of knowledge and into a space of indeterminacy or unintelligibility. And this I would furthermore suggest is a form of violence. When people are labelled climate migrants or potential climate migrants, they are forced to occupy a space of non-recognition, a space in which their recognition as political subjects is deferred. But even more importantly, what I am trying to emphasise is that the process of dehumanisation that I have just described is also the very process constituting the very human who is also the subject of the discourse. The human acquires its status as such through the process of dehumanisation, through the act of deferring recognition of the other who is yet to come.

Geographies of Potential

Let us turn now to my final concept: geographies of potential. With this concept I want to draw together the elements of the threshold and dehumanisation to tell a story about the geographical imagination through which the human comes to be understood. The discourse on climate change and migration constructs space and its inhabitants as objects of potential. Many claim that when climate change gains purchase on the world one of its more formidable effects is that it will exacerbate human migration. With climate change, the world is said to be on the verge of a new migration paradigm, on the verge of a new spatial redistribution of people on a global scale. But if we accept that climate change and migration opens up in the space of the threshold between present and future, and if we also accept that the discourse on climate change and migration dehumanises climate migrants and climate refugees by positioning them outside historical time, then what we are left with is a geography that does not coincide with any actual space, nor with any actually existing set of historical circumstances. What we are left with instead is a geography of potential, space characterised by a future scenario and evacuated of its historical content. This is a geography in which an imagined future authorises political action in the present. It authorises not only the global effort to mitigate climate change, but also policies that seek to manage migration in the wider interest of political stability and security in the climate change context. But the trouble is that the phenomenon itself does not exist. It is pure speculation. Moreover it displaces history from any consideration of space, and in so doing it renders history insignificant for how space might be understood, experienced or lived. Political intervention thus becomes concerned with neutralising space by pre-empting an imagined future as opposed to reversing historically produced injustice. But perhaps above all, through its emphasis on the future, the discourse on climate change and migration produces an imaginary in which priority is given to managing, containing and adapting to the consequences of climate change, specifically migrants, but not one in which new forms of political, social and economic life might be imagined. Indeed, this is an imaginary in which recognition of the inherent openness of the future is suspended in favour of one which imposes a certain finitude on the future.

Conclusion

By way of a conclusion I would like to return to my argument that the discourse on climate change and migration is less concerned with managing the other of climate change than it is with recentring the human. It is about governing *our* relationship with the future and with climate change. In this sense, the discourse is about cultivating among the habitants of Europe or the West a sense that in spite of the destabilising certainties of climate change, the perceived primacy of the West will not be destabilised when climate change gains purchase on the world. By constructing large swathes of the global population as living on the verge of mass migration, or indeed of constructing climate change as a problem of migration, the discourse displaces the crisis of values that brought climate change into being – consumption, the exploitation of fossil fuels, colonialism – back onto those who are said to be the victims of climate change: migrants and refugees. Managing climate change thus becomes a matter of managing the movements of others and not of confronting the crisis of values that underpins climate change. The result is a discourse that re-elevates the West, Europe and humanism, at the very world-historical moment when geophysical phenomena like climate change and the Anthropocene threaten the very conditions that make human life possible.

Reference List

Adams, H. (2015) Why populations persist: mobility, place attachment and climate change. *Population and Environment*, published online 16 September, no pagination.

Baldwin, A. (2013) Racialisation and the figure of the climate change migrant. *Environment and Planning A* 45: 1474–90.

- - - . (2014) The political theologies of climate change-induced migration. *Critical Studies on Security* 2: 210–22.

- - - . (2017a) Climate change, migration, and the crisis of humanism. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 8: 1–7.

- - - . (2017b) Postcolonial futures: climate, race, and the yet-to-come. *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment* 24: 292–305.

- - - . (2017c) Resilience and race, or climate change and the uninsurable migrant: towards an anthroporacial reading of race. *Resilience: International Policies, Practices, and Discourses* 5: 129–42.

Baldwin, A. and Bettini, G. (eds.) (2017) Introduction: Life Adrift. In *Life Adrift: Climate Change, Migration, Critique*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Bennett, J. (2010) *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Black, R., Kniveton, D. and Schmidt-Verkerk, K. (2011) Migration and climate change: towards an integrated assessment of sensitivity. *Environment and Planning A* 43: 431–50.

Conisbee, M. and Sims, A. (2003) *Environmental Refugees: The Case for Recognition*. London: New Economics Foundation.

Deleuze, G. (1994) *Difference and Repetition*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gemenne, F. (2011) Climate-induced population displacements in a 4 degree Celsius+ world. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences Series A* 369: 182–95.

IPCC (2014) Fifth Assessment Report, Working Group II: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

McLeman, R. and Hunter, L. M. (2010) Migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues. *Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 1: 450–61.

McNamara, K. E. and Gibson, C. (2009) 'We do not want to leave our land': Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of 'climate refugees'. *Geoforum* 40: 475–83.

Povinelli, E. (2011) *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism*. London and Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Schwartz, P. and Randall, D. (2003) *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security*. New York: Global Business Network.

Shields, R. (2003) *The Virtual*. London and New York: Routledge.

UK Foresight (2011) Migration and global environmental change. Final project report. London: The Government Office for Science.

Backlist of Papers Published in Insights

No.	Author	Title	Series
2008 Volume 1			
1	Boris Wiseman	Lévi-Strauss, Caduveo Body Painting and the Readymade: Thinking Borderlines	General
2	John Hedley Brooke	Can Scientific Discovery be a Religious Experience?	Darwin's Legacy
3	Bryan R. Cullen	Rapid and Ongoing Darwinian Selection of the Human Genome	Darwin's Legacy
4	Penelope Deutscher	Women, Animality, Immunity – and the Slave of the Slave	Darwin's Legacy
5	Martin Harwit	The Growth of Astrophysical Understanding	Modelling
6	Donald MacKenzie	Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of Carbon Markets	Modelling
7	Lorraine Code	Thinking Ecologically about Biology	Darwin's Legacy
8	Eric Winsberg	A Function for Fictions: Expanding the Scope of Science	Modelling
9	Willard Bohn	Visual Poetry in France after Apollinaire	Modelling
10	Robert A. Skipper Jr	R. A. Fisher and the Origins of Random Drift	Darwin's Legacy
11	Nancy Cartwright	Models: Parables v Fables	Modelling
12	Atholl Anderson	Problems of the 'Traditionalist' Model of Long-Distance Polynesian Voyaging	Modelling
2009 Volume 2			
1	Robert A. Walker	Where Species Begin: Structure, Organization and Stability in Biological Membranes and Model Membrane Systems	Darwin's Legacy
2	Michael Pryke	'What is Going On?' Seeking Visual Cues Amongst the Flows of Global Finance	Modelling
3	Ronaldo I. Borja	Landslides and Debris Flow Induced by Rainfall	Modelling
4	Roland Fletcher	Low-Density, Agrarian-Based Urbanism: A Comparative View	Modelling
5	Paul Ormerod	21st Century Economics	Modelling
6	Peter C. Matthews	Guiding the Engineering Process: Path of Least Resistance versus Creative Fiction	Modelling
7	Bernd Goebel	Anselm's Theory of Universals Reconsidered	Modelling
8	Roger Smith	Locating History in the Human Sciences	Being Human
9	Sonia Kruks	Why Do We Humans Seek Revenge and Should We?	Being Human
10	Mark Turner	Thinking With Feeling	Being Human
11	Christa Davis Acampora	Agonistic Politics and the War on Terror	Being Human
12	Arun Saldanha	So What <i>Is</i> Race?	Being Human
13	Daniel Beunza and David Stark	Devices For Doubt: Models and Reflexivity in Merger Arbitrage	Modelling
14	Robert Hariman	Democratic Stupidity	Being Human
2010 Volume 3			
1	John Haslett and Peter Challenor	Palaeoclimate Histories	Modelling
2	Zoltán Kövecses	Metaphorical Creativity in Discourse	Modelling
3	Maxine Sheets-Johnstone	Strangers, Trust, and Religion: On the Vulnerability of Being Alive	Darwin's Legacy

No.	Author	Title	Series
4	Jill Gordon	On Being Human in Medicine	Being Human
5	Eduardo Mendieta	Political Bestiary: On the Uses of Violence	Being Human
6	Charles Fernyhough	What is it Like to Be a Small Child?	Being Human
7	Maren Stange	Photography and the End of Segregation	Being Human
8	Andy Baker	Water Colour: Processes Affecting Riverine Organic Carbon Concentration	Water
9	Iain Chambers	Maritime Criticism and Lessons from the Sea	Water
10	Christer Bruun	Imperial Power, Legislation, and Water Management in the Roman Empire	Water
11	Chris Brooks	Being Human, Human Rights and Modernity	Being Human
12	Ingo Gildenhard and Andrew Zissos	Metamorphosis - Angles of Approach	Being Human
13	Ezio Todini	A Model for Developing Integrated and Sustainable Energy and Water Resources Strategies	Water
14	Veronica Strang	Water, Culture and Power: Anthropological Perspectives from 'Down Under'	Water
15	Richard Arculus	Water and Volcanism	Water
16	Marilyn Strathern	A Tale of Two Letters: Reflections on Knowledge Conversions	Water
17	Paul Langley	Cause, Condition, Cure: Liquidity in the Global Financial Crisis, 2007–8	Water
18	Stefan Helmreich	Waves	Water
19	Jennifer Terry	The Work of Cultural Memory: Imagining Atlantic Passages in the Literature of the Black Diaspora	Water
20	Monica M. Grady	Does Life on Earth Imply Life on Mars?	Water
21	Ian Wright	Water Worlds	Water
22	Shlomi Dinar, Olivia Odom, Amy McNally, Brian Blankespoor and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya	Climate Change and State Grievances: The Water Resiliency of International River Treaties to Increased Water Variability	Water
23	Robin Findlay Hendry	Science and Everyday Life: Water vs H ₂ O	Water

2011 Volume 4

1	Stewart Clegg	The Futures of Bureaucracy?	Futures
2	Henrietta Mondry	Genetic Wars: The Future in Eurasianist Fiction of Aleksandr Prokhanov	Futures
3	Barbara Graziosi	The Iliad: Configurations of the Future	Futures
4	Jonathon Porritt	Scarcity and Sustainability in Utopia	Futures
5	Andrew Crumey	Can Novelists Predict the Future?	Futures
6	Russell Jacoby	The Future of Utopia	Futures
7	Frances Bartkowski	All That is Plastic... Patricia Piccinini's Kinship Network	Being Human
8	Mary Carruthers	The Mosque That Wasn't: A Study in Social Memory Making	Futures
9	Andrew Pickering	Ontological Politics: Realism and Agency in Science, Technology and Art	Futures
10	Kathryn Banks	Prophecy and Literature	Futures
11	Barbara Adam	Towards a Twenty-First-Century Sociological Engagement with the Future	Futures
12	Andrew Crumey and Mikhail Epstein	A Dialogue on Creative Thinking and the Future of the Humanities	Futures
13	Mikhail Epstein	On the Future of the Humanities	Futures

No.	Author	Title	Series
2012 Volume 5			
1	Elizabeth Archibald	Bathing, Beauty and Christianity in the Middle Ages	Futures II
2	Fabio Zampieri	The Holistic Approach of Evolutionary Medicine: An Epistemological Analysis	Futures II
3	Lynnette Leidy Sievert	Choosing the Gold Standard: Subjective Report vs Physiological Measure	Futures II
4	Elizabeth Edwards	Photography, Survey and the Desire for 'History'	Futures II
5	Ben Anderson	Emergency Futures	Futures
6	Pier Paolo Saviotti	Are There Discontinuities in Economic Development?	Futures II
7	Sander L. Gilman	'Stand Up Straight': Notes Toward a History of Posture	Futures II
8	Meredith Lloyd-Evans	Limitations and Liberations	Futures II
2013 Volume 6			
1	David Martin-Jones	The Cinematic Temporalities of Modernity: Deleuze, Quijano and <i>How Tasty was my Little Frenchman</i>	Time
2	Robert Levine	Time Use, Happiness and Implications for Social Policy: A Report to the United Nations	Time
3	Andy Wood	Popular Senses of Time and Place in Tudor and Stuart England	Time
4	Robert Hannah	From Here to the Hereafter: 'Genesis' and 'Apogenesis' in Ancient Philosophy and Architecture	Time
5	Alia Al-Saji	Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the Past	Time
6	Simon Prosser	Is there a 'Specious Present'?	Time
2014 Volume 7			
1	Robert Fosbury	Colours from Earth	Light
2	Mary Manjikian	Thinking about Crisis, Thinking about Emergency	Time
3	Tim Edensor	The Potentialities of Light Festivals	Light
4	Angharad Closs Stephens	National and Urban Ways of Seeing	Light
5	Robert de Mello Koch	From Field Theory to Spacetime Using Permutations	Time
6	Jonathan Ben-Dov	What's In a Year? An Incomplete Study on the Notion of Completeness	Time
7	Lesley Chamberlain	Clarifying the Enlightenment	Light
8	Fokko Jan Dijksterhuis	Matters of Light. Ways of Knowing in Enlightened Optics	Light
2015 Volume 8			
1	Valerie M. Jones	Mobile Health Systems and Emergence	Emergence
2	Stéphanie Portet	Studying the Cytoskeleton: Case of Intermediate Filaments	Modelling
3	Peter Cane	Two Conceptions of Constitutional Rights	Emergence
4	Nathan J. Citino	Cultural Encounter as 'Emergence': Rethinking US-Arab Relations	Emergence
5	N. Katherine Hayles	Nonconscious Cognition and Jess Stoner's <i>I Have Blinded Myself Writing This</i>	Emergence
6	Alice Hills	Waiting for Tipping Points	Emergence
7	Margaret Morrison	Mathematical Explanation and Complex Systems	Emergence
8	Tim Thornton	Emergence, Meaning and Rationality	Emergence
9	John Heil	The Mystery of the Mystery of Consciousness	Emergence

No.	Author	Title	Series
10	David C. Geary	Sex Differences in Vulnerability	Emergence
11	Richard Read	Negation, Possibilisation, Emergence and the Reversed Painting	Emergence

2016 Volume 9

1	George Williams	An Australian Perspective on the UK Human Rights Act Debate	Evidence
2	James E. Gardner	Can We Gain Evidence About Volcanic Pyroclastic Flows from Those Who Survive Them?	Evidence
3	John Brewer	Art and the Evidence of Attribution. Giovanni Morelli, Morellians and Morellianism: Thoughts on 'Scientific Connoisseurship'	Evidence
4	Claire Langhamer	An Archive of Feeling? Mass Observation and the Mid-Century Moment	Evidence
5	Heike Egner	The IPCC's Interdisciplinary Dilemma: What Natural and Social Sciences Could (and Should) Learn from Physics	Evidence
6	Barbara Dancygier	Reading Images, Reading Words: Visual and Textual Conceptualization of Barriers and Containers	Evidence
7	William Downes	Two Concepts of Relevance and the Emergence of Mind	Emergence
8	Martin Coward	Crossing the Threshold of Concern: How Infrastructure Emerges as an Object of Security	Emergence

2017 Volume 10

1	Ted Gup	America and the Death of Facts: 'Politics and the War on Rationalism'	Evidence
2	Jan Clarke	Back to Black: Variable Lighting Levels on the Seventeenth-Century French Stage, Lavoisier and the Enigma of <i>La Pierre philosophale</i>	Light
3	Heather Douglas	Sexual Violence and Evidence: The Approach of the Feminist Judge	Evidence
4	David T. F. Dryden	What Have Restriction Enzymes Ever Done For Us?	Evidence
5	Jessica Brown	Evidence and Scepticism	Evidence
6	Richard Walsh	Complexity, Scale, Story: Narrative Models in Will Self and Enid Blyton	Scale
7	Julia Prest	Performing the Racial Scale: From Colonial Saint-Domingue to Contemporary Hollywood	Scale
8	Jon Hesk	Greek Thinking, Fast and Slow. Euripides and Thucydides on Deliberation and Decision-Making	Scale
9	Frances Morphy & Howard Morphy	Relative Autonomy, Sociocultural Trajectories and the Emergence of Something New	Emergence
10	Carlo Vecce	The Fading Evidence of Reality: Leonardo and the End	Evidence

Insights

Insights is edited by Nicholas Saul, IAS Director and Professor of German Literature and Intellectual History.

Correspondence should be directed to Pauline Edmondson (pauline.edmondson@durham.ac.uk).