


Locating History in the Human Sciences



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LOCATING HISTORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

*What arguments might lead English-language scholars to count history among the human sciences? And, more deeply, what arguments justify the view that historical knowledge is essential to human self-understanding (individually and collectively) and hence is essential to 'being human'? This paper addresses these questions, drawing on my book, *Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature*, but reshaping a number of points in the light of discussion at the Institute of Advanced Study in Durham, and elsewhere, in the autumn of 2008. It is a summary of reasons for thinking that the history of the human sciences is central to the human sciences. The argument uses the notion of reflexivity to find an alternative form of human self-understanding to those characteristic of philosophical anthropology, on the one hand, and evolutionary biology and neuroscience on the other. The human phenomenon in which knowledge-forming about human beings changes who they are – the phenomenon in which the subject 'does not stand still' – appears to require an appreciation of history as knowledge of human self-creation. I develop this point of view in the light of a general rejection of claims that any one way of understanding is 'fundamental.' Rather, this paper argues, there are different forms of knowledge, biological, historical, sociological or whatever, for different purposes. To understand what these purposes are and how they relate at one and the same time to past and current ways of life, in all their contextual particularity, is one of the principal aims of the history of the human sciences.*

Why History of the Human Sciences?

I published two books about establishing the sciences of being human. For the first, a history of the human sciences (Smith, 1997), the publishers insisted on putting a brain image, from a scan, on the cover. A lit-up brain, to my perception exploding inside a skull, therefore adorns the cover. A perfect image of the thinking brain, the publishers assured me. The second book (Smith, 2007), called, by chance, *Being Human*, like the project at the Institute of Advanced Study in 2008–9, has a self-portrait. This is my choice of a picture of a person, reflecting a kind of self-knowledge. Between these images lie many questions.

For a historian to attempt philosophy may be unwise. If I make the venture, it is in response to four kinds of intellectual questions which I brought to the IAS and which, I conclude, require the same kind of answer. They are these:

1) I am sometimes asked to clarify what 'the history of the human sciences' refers to, or, even, to say what are 'the human sciences.' It is not possible to respond straightforwardly because the notion of the human sciences denotes fields of debate rather than well delineated areas of knowledge or institutionally defined disciplines. There are large differences, notably, about whether the human sciences centre on human biology. All the same, the term 'human sciences' denotes a cluster of disciplines without precisely specifying which disciplines, and this is helpful because which disciplines are as a matter of social fact included in the human sciences varies with local institutional circumstances. 'Human sciences' is also useful for historians as a generic term for the sciences with 'the human' as the subject, as the term leaves it open for historical research to determine what those sciences were once actually called or how they were once configured. I want to use the term, however, also to signal argument, first,

that history is a human science, and, second, that the history of the human sciences is central to the human sciences. To say why I think these things required a philosophical book. The reason, in a nutshell, is that we cannot say what the human sciences are without engaging with complex debates about *what it is to be human*.

2) I taught for many years in the history department at Lancaster University. My colleagues were enthusiasts and spoke with enviable panache about their subject areas, but they were, by and large, not at all comfortable with making intellectual arguments about why history matters. History was, for them, as it is to many students of history, above all, fun. They also wanted to restate the old argument that history is necessary for good citizenship. I want to argue that a defence of history as historical *knowledge* is necessary before we can say – if we wish to say – that it is necessary to citizenship and fun.

3) Neuroscientific, evolutionary and genetic approaches to human nature have enormous visibility in contemporary public and academic arenas of science. Enthusiasm for these areas of knowledge slides into belief that such knowledge is in some sense *fundamental*, the basis for other kinds of knowledge. Critics of this slide express moral or spiritual disquiet or attack what they discern as scientism. But what exactly are the arguments which rule out any claim that biological knowledge contributes the basic, or ultimate, level of human self-understanding? Or have the biologists got it right? Earlier religious or humanistic claims, that biology does not grasp or do justice to the human spirit or the individual personality, now look rather vacuous. Structural, sociological arguments, though profoundly necessary, find it hard to compete with biological ways of thought in the public arena. Are there alternatives?

4) I am interested in the historiography of psychology – how the history of psychology is written. In this field there is interest in, and large disagreement about, the extent to which psychological categories (perception, memory, intelligence, etc.), and even the category ‘psychology’ itself, describe universal human states or processes, or themselves have a history. This interest also raises questions about the relation between history and the human sciences.

The Argument

My response, which I put forward in *Being Human*, and tried to take further while at the IAS in Durham, was to reassert the standing of historical knowledge as, in its own irreducible way, fundamental knowledge. I want to make a few summary comments about what such a claim might mean.

The thesis is (1) that there are purposes for which historical knowledge is necessary (necessary as a matter of reason), not just optional, entertaining or decorative; and (2) that historical knowledge is not dependent on, or reducible to, some purportedly more basic level of explanation or understanding; and, therefore, the human sciences include history and the history of the human sciences is intrinsic to their activity. Thus, when we make historical statements, we make statements which we cannot reduce to other kinds of statements without change of meaning and loss of knowledge.

The defence of history as an occupation and disciplinary field is the same as the defence of any science – the defence of a form of knowledge. Some people will think this self-evident and hence wonder why I am defending the obvious. For many other people, however, perhaps biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists or medical scientists, it is not at all obvious. In fact, to spell out why historical knowledge is necessary and irreducible proves to be a very complex

matter indeed. Moreover, to spell this out with rhetoric which scientists will actually respond to constructively raises another set of daunting challenges.

The Natural Sciences, the Human Sciences and Reflexivity

Because of its familiarity, I take as the point of departure the old chestnut, the relation between the human sciences (centrally the psychological and social sciences) and the natural sciences. Contemporary evolutionary scientists and neuroscientists are once again, like their Victorian forebears, laying claim to the truth and prestige of extending natural science to encompass human nature, fulfilling the promise opened by Darwin's work. In earlier decades, there were, broadly, two intellectual reservations about this step. The first presupposed a kind of philosophical anthropology, that is, an argument, empirical, metaphysical and perhaps religious, that there is something in the being of being human (like reason itself) which natural science forms of knowledge cannot understand. The second reservation was sociological, often though not necessarily Marxian in character, and involved some version of the claim that human *history*, because it involves culturally or economically mediated interaction with nature, separates the human and the natural worlds. The question now is, whether we can plausibly restate either of these reservations about biology becoming the basic science of being human.

Philosophical anthropology underlay rather vague, humanistic ideals, such as those conveyed in statements about 'a common humanity,' frequent, for example, in the rhetoric founding the United Nations, or about 'soul-making' (in Keats's phrase). It was Foucault, in *The Order of Things* (1966), who most decisively and influentially attacked the pretensions of philosophical anthropology to provide a basis for the human sciences. In his book, he argued that the forms of understanding of the human subject which modern writers presume to be universal had historically limited horizons and would be erased in the future. When he wrote, he might have had someone like Georges Gusdorf in mind – the Gusdorf who was then launching a twelve volume study, *Les sciences humaines et la pensée occidentale* (1966–85). Foucault discarded such talk and directed attention to the constitution of regimes of truth, understood as practices of discipline and management (or *governmentalité*). What Foucault initiated, others continued. It became common in the social sciences and humanities to presume that there are no statements about 'the human' which are free of historically, linguistically or culturally contingent presuppositions, presuppositions in principle vulnerable to critical deconstruction. Expressed in other terms, this was belief that there is no transcendental human subject. As a result, researchers concentrated on how specific people at specific times constitute knowledge about 'the human' in particular, contingent ways as fields for the exercise of power in the ordering of human life.

At more or less the same time, and in complete contrast, the strong believers in evolutionary science and neuroscience claimed to lay a basis for a transcendental human subject in the material past, in natural selection operating on the Pleistocene savannah of Africa. The resulting gap in contemporary intellectual life appears to me to be enormous. Between the realist theory of knowledge which many natural scientists, and not a few historians, take for granted, and the theory of knowledge widespread in sections of the humanities, which rejects the possibility of foundations, there is a gulf – not the least of the issues in the so-called 'science wars.'

Systematic philosophical anthropology and its post-structuralist dissection arose out of continental European debate with the legacy of Kant. All the same, there are important and

perhaps insufficiently appreciated links between the continental work and Anglo-American analytic criticism of the positivist theory of knowledge. I have in mind particularly the analytic argument that there cannot be a body of knowledge which does not contain unfounded propositions, that is, propositions which the body of knowledge itself cannot justify. Evidence necessarily underdetermines theory. The implications for present purposes are twofold. It is always possible, in principle, to turn critically to the unfounded propositions of a body of knowledge, to expose them and to play with them ironically, and perhaps to argue for change. Within a particular community of natural or social scientists, or for that matter historians, this is not normally done – and for good reasons if the existing body of knowledge sustains a productive research programme. Secondly, if it is not possible to translate a body of knowledge into a set of statements of empirical facts, we must recognize that anyone's commitment to a body of knowledge always expresses a value or a purpose. It is always possible to ask, why *this* body of knowledge and not some other, and to answer this question we then must ask, why knowledge for *this* purpose and not some other. If, as scholars and scientists conventionally maintain, the purpose of knowledge is truth, any knowledge claim puts forward truth as a value, and this notion of truth is not something which scientific knowledge itself provides knowledge of but derives from a way of life, that is, a social purpose.

Thus the critique of positivism reached conclusions comparable with arguments put forward by Foucault and those who thought like him: there are no foundations for knowledge, including the most basic knowledge of what it is to be human, independent of presuppositions, and those presuppositions have historical, linguistic and cultural content. Any revised philosophical anthropology must take account of this.

If we turn now to claims that there is a significant sense in which human history is discontinuous with the evolutionary past, we have to note, as a social fact, that there is currently debate about this, even among biologists. My own arguments in this area take off from the topic of *reflexivity*. This is a term which different authors have used in different ways, for example, to describe the critical reflection of a discipline on itself. I use it to refer to the capacity, intrinsically bound up with consciousness, language and culture, which makes 'the human' the subject of knowledge. It characterises the way in which being human is to be both the knowing subject and the object of knowledge, and the term refers equally to the collective and the individual forms of knowing 'the human.' It is not simply that there is a kind of being with the mental capacity for reflection, as, for example, Locke maintained, but that the act of reflection changes the nature and identity of the subject which is engaged in the reflection. An obvious model for understanding this is psychotherapy, since in the psychotherapeutic process the aim is to acquire knowledge (or, perhaps not exactly knowledge but language or emotion), which by its acquisition (or means of acquisition) changes the nature of the client. But the argument is perfectly general in relation to being human: the knowing act, of whatever kind, changes the subject who or which (if it is an institution) is engaged in the knowing. The object of knowledge does not stand still.

This is a conclusion with a long history and many variations. A significant number of writers – R. G. Collingwood is a good example – have claimed that it is precisely this which demarcates the human sciences from the natural sciences. 'An improvement in [...] [human] science is an improvement in its subject but in its object also [...]. Hence the historical development of the science of human nature entails an historical development in human nature itself' (Collingwood, 1946/1961, pp. 83–4). In the natural sciences, the subject matter is as it was after we gain knowledge of it, while in the human sciences it is not – historical culture, because of its reflexive nature, continuously changes the subject. Radically understood, as it has been by some idealists in philosophy (such as Ortega y Gasset, 1936), this is the claim

that man has no nature (no biological nature) but only history. Few people would now concur with that kind of idealism. All the same, understanding the implications of reflexivity, I would argue, must be at the core of the theory of knowledge in the human sciences.

The phenomenon of reflexivity also gives a kind of unity to the human sciences since it imposes a shared set of general questions, a shared *problématique*. And note: if knowledge in the human sciences changes the subject, this explains why it is not possible simply to define these sciences by the content of knowledge. The content and the process by which we gain knowledge of the content are mutually interrelated.

I do not believe that reflexivity does, finally, demarcate the human from the natural sciences. I think there are senses in which knowledge of the natural world also alters that world (and we might read Bruno Latour, 1984/1988, for example, as supporting such a view). Reflexivity is also embedded and embodied, a material phenomenon, the subject matter in the analysis of power and practice and not only knowledge. Ian Hacking has made aspects of this familiar through his account of what he calls 'the looping effect of human kinds,' illustrated by psychiatric conditions like multiple personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (Hacking, 2002).

But my principal point now is this. If knowledge of individual or collective ways of being human changes that nature, then human self-knowledge of necessity, not contingently, includes knowledge of the reflexive cycle, knowledge of the reconstitution of the subject through the knowing act. Knowledge of this process is intrinsically *historical knowledge* – as Collingwood indicated. In order to know what it is to be human, we require historical knowledge of the reflexive action by which the human subject has reconstituted itself as a subject. Now this, I think, is a radical claim. It is in striking contrast with evolutionary claims in which biologists empirically identify a core of fixed human nature, knowledge of which they then claim is basic for the human sciences. It is also in striking contrast to the Enlightenment 'science of Man' and to the tradition of philosophical anthropology, and it seems to detract from the humanistic ideals invested in belief in a universal human nature. If there are universals, it would seem according to the point I am now making, they must be sought in the universality of the reflexive process not in the content of human nature. To go down this road further is to engage metaphysical questions, which goes beyond what I need to attempt here.

Reflexivity and History

The implications of the reflexivity argument interest me as a historian because they involve substantial reconsideration of the scope and subject matter of the history of the psychological and social sciences. The significant implication is that the category psychology itself, as well as psychological categories like memory, emotion and will are not natural kinds but culturally and historically constituted ways of carving up the world. In the philosopher Hilary Putnam's words, 'we cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description' (Putnam, 1981, p. 51, quoted in *Being Human*, p. 65), and, psychologists like Kurt Danziger and Graham Richards say, as well as myself, psychological categories belong to such a 'scheme of description' (Danziger, 1997; Richards, 1996/2002; Smith, 2005). Parallel arguments apply for categories in the social sciences.

The thesis is very difficult to articulate before an audience of natural scientists because it so goes against the grain of their informal realist theory of knowledge. The scientists *know*, in their world, that psychology, personality and so on, exist as objects not constructions.

Moreover, the reflexivity thesis raises the awesome spectacle of the history of psychology including the history of the coming into being of its subject matter. What would a history of psychology which encompasses the coming into being of things like memory and emotion, as well as knowledge and practice about these things, be like? Studies such as Thomas Dixon's on the Victorian ascendancy of the language of emotions rather than passions, or Chris Goodey's on the early modern sources of 'intelligence' in concern about disability, suggest empirical, historical ways forward (Dixon, 2003; Goodey, 2001).

The reflexivity argument is central to the thesis that historical knowledge is irreducible as knowledge and essential in the human sciences. History is the form of knowledge of the self-constituting process which is the subject matter of the human sciences.

I have tried rhetorically to bolster my stance by practising a certain kind of history, a history which shows, on the one hand, that there is substantial precedent for the position, and on the other hand, that earlier arguments are a very significant resource in responding to the view that only natural science can provide the human sciences with a scientific foundation. I use intellectual history as a way to step back to look again at the relations between the natural sciences and the human sciences.

Specifically, I look at different conceptions of science and different forms of knowledge among the sciences as an important dimension of debate about the nature and demarcation of the human sciences. In the English-speaking world, usage equates 'science' with natural science (or science modelled on natural science) – though this has been common only since the very end of the nineteenth century. With this usage in mind, it is possible to understand why the question whether a particular field *is or is not a science* has been a prominent feature of relations between areas of scholarship and of self-promoting claims by fields, like psychology, to be a science. By contrast, in continental Europe, where the word 'science' denotes any body of knowledge which is rationally grounded and thought to be true, there has been more debate about *relations among the sciences* – as, for example, with the language and arguments differentiating *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*. Continental usage is more conducive to thinking about historical knowledge as having equal standing epistemologically with natural science knowledge, and for thinking about the history of the human sciences as part of the human sciences. If they were to adopt continental usage, historians would not be in the position of saying, defensively, why their field is not a science though it claims to be a discipline, and perhaps even resorting to the cliché that it is an art not a science. They could instead debate the relations between forms of knowledge of presumed equal epistemological standing.

The different usages also have implications for historiography, for historical writing. Contemporary evolutionary scientists and neuroscientists take it for granted that the history of science shows the progressive recognition of the power and scope of the natural sciences to encompass human subjects. There is repeated reference to science overcoming Cartesian dualism and disproving the existence of the soul. Reacting against this, I have tried to reconstruct an alternative way of thinking in the history of thought, one which recognises that there may be a science which is not a natural science or modelled on a natural science, and hence recognises that the history of the human sciences may have a plot which is not the expansion of the natural sciences. I have searched for what I call 'precedents for the human sciences,' thus flagging the long background to the argument that there may be sciences of the human subject, such as history, which are not natural sciences.

The dominant historiography in Anglo-American history of science presupposes a view of the human sciences which by its very language excludes history as part of the science of the human. I think it excludes a large part of what the history of the human sciences might be about. Professional historians of science, of course, distance themselves from the triumphalist tones of some science writing, but they might be hard put to say what other plot there could be for the history of the human sciences than the extension of the natural sciences, especially evolutionary theory, into and across the human sphere. But there can be other plots, and I have tried to characterise the one which I find historically central. It is the plot centred on the reshaping of claims that there is a human science which is not a natural science, because its starting point presupposes reflexivity and hence the human creation of what is human through language and culture. If one welcomes a legendary founding father, then it is Vico and not Descartes, and its *dramatis personae* includes Vico and Herder, through Marx, Dilthey, Cassirer to Gadamer and the so-called interpretive or hermeneutic practitioners of the contemporary academic scene. It is a plot which, I argue, enables one to describe history as a science and to identify the history of the human sciences as central to the human sciences. It is also a plot which is or ought to be central to any discussion of the so-called ‘two cultures.’

I am *not* saying that there is an explanatory form of knowledge in the natural sciences and an interpretive form of knowledge in the human sciences, and that we can write a story about each intellectual tradition. It is one of the important conclusions of post-positivist thought (as well as of Gadamer, 1960/1988) that all knowledge is in a sense interpretive; part of the critique of positivism is the recognition that interpretation is not a method but the substance of all knowledge formation. Conversely, many scholars in the humanities, and historians very commonly, employ explanatory discourse of the kind supposed to be characteristic of the natural sciences. If there are epistemological differences between the natural sciences and the human sciences, they derive from the existence of reflexivity and not from a false contrast between explanatory and interpretive modes of knowing.

Another problem with the cliché about the natural sciences being explanatory and the humanities being interpretive is the ambiguous position in which this puts the psychological, social and medical sciences. Their history is a long record of divergence of view about the appropriateness of methods and forms of knowledge modelled on the natural sciences versus methods and forms of knowledge originating in the study of language and texts or in the clinical encounter. The psychological, social and medical sciences have been and still are divided – between physical and social anthropology, between quantitative and qualitative sociological methods, between biological psychology and psychoanalysis, between scientific and alternative medicine, and so on. Very often, and I think unhelpfully, the relation and contrast between these alternatives has been debated as if the intellectually important question is, what will constitute a particular field as a science? By contrast, historians of the psychological and social sciences have written much about those debates as concerning institutional power, professional growth and the like.

By working on ‘precedents’ for the human sciences, I seek an alternative to the accepted historiography in the history of science. It is a convention, not a necessity, to write in terms of the progressive extension of the natural sciences to the human sphere. It presupposes one version of what the human sciences are, and in fact it is possible to write different histories about the human sciences if they are differently understood. What might be said against this is that it may fail to do justice to the fact that it is the natural sciences which have power in the modern world, and hence it is the story of their expansion into the human sphere which we must tell.

But the direction of these arguments, I emphasise, is *not* that one kind of knowledge is appropriate for the natural world and another for the human. Rather, the position is that there are different forms of knowledge, and that the reasons for choosing one form of knowledge rather than another lie with the *value, purpose or interest* we have in the knowledge, not with the *subject matter* of the knowledge. It is no part of my brief to maintain an essential difference between the human and the natural; indeed, it appears to be an empirical matter to determine what humans and animals have in common and what not. It is my intention, however, to argue that there are forms of explanation other than those which start from the animal-like nature of being human.

I thus need to say something about the existence of different forms of knowledge for different purposes. That there are indeed different forms of knowledge was a point made clear, for example, in the critical response of analytic philosophy to behaviourism in the 1950s and 1960s. If I want knowledge of why someone gets up and walks out while I am talking, I want to know about reasons not about the motor control system. The purposes and hence appropriate forms of knowledge in the human sciences may be (sometimes or largely) different from the purposes and forms of knowledge in the natural sciences. If we presuppose the truth of one form of knowledge, what we are presupposing is also the appropriateness of certain kinds of purposes rather than others. Once we debate our purposes, including the purposes of natural science, we will have to acknowledge the possible place of different forms of knowledge.

The Purposes of Knowledge and the Purposes of Life

Here the reflexivity argument opens up a very large view. There is, I have just argued, a close connection between our purposes and our forms of knowledge. But this is a reflexive connection. That is, by having certain kinds of purposes and certain kinds of knowledge, we constitute an identity, or a nature, for ourselves, individually and collectively. The kind of knowledge which we pursue is integrated with the kind of life which we want. For example, if we want control over the individual person as a technological system, perhaps because that system malfunctions and we have illness, we pursue neuroscience. If we want knowledge that contributes to finding a meaning in life, then we must look elsewhere, for example, in knowledge of the cultural traditions which give us a notion of meaning or of truth.

The *history* of the human sciences has the potential to make clear the details, the particularities, of reflexive processes over time. It is or ought to be central to the human sciences because the history gives knowledge of the self-constituting processes which have created the kind of being and the forms of knowledge of that being that we now have. The statement is glib enough. It is a real challenge to find appropriate rhetoric in the current climate of opinion committed to biological explanation to the exclusion of knowledge of the purposes, context and form of knowledge of such biological explanation.

Though, as I have said, a distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities, based on the idea that the former are explanatory ('bodily') and the latter interpretive ('mental'), is untenable, there obviously are differences in the norms of how knowledge is expressed. The norm in history is the narrative – history writing attends to particularity and seeks to render the particular intelligible by locating it within a story with a recognisable plot. The narrative constantly deploys causal explanations, as people do in ordinary speech, but it does not usually seek generalised causal explanation. My point in returning to stress narrative is to help throw into the limelight the extent to which history writing constructs knowledge for a purpose. Of course, purposes are not given in the primary materials on which historians

rhetorically base what they say. Indeed, as many people accept, it is always possible to tell more than one story about given events, and the facts, however thoroughly researched, never fully determine what the historian writes. Historians choose their stories, though what I here call 'choice' is not primarily a matter of conscious individual intention but reflects the conventions of institutionalised practice.

We should again take account of reflexivity. History writing is the way we arrive at a story which both informs who people think they are and has the potential to change who they are – to change what identity they have and what place they think they have in the world. Who we are, the way we live, is a function of what stories we tell about ourselves, just as what stories we tell is a representation of who we are and how we live. This process is relatively easy to see in the case of national histories, as, for example, in Israel, where historical writing inevitably ties description of the founding of the state to current national policy questions. It is less visible, but structurally the same argument applies, for instance, to psychological knowledge: what account we favour of psychological knowledge, and even the very willingness to give so much attention to psychological knowledge, implicates decisions about what sort of being human we commit ourselves to.

The central part of what I am saying is embedded in the commonplace recognition among historians that 'choice,' values, enters historical scholarship with the selection of topics, primary source materials and interpretation. I am merely restating this recognition as a general feature of knowledge formation not a peculiarity of history. Furthermore, the reflexivity argument provides the persuasive underpinning to the long-running commitment of historians to history as a contribution to good citizenship. When people say that citizens or voters ought to be historically informed, this is not empty moralism. At base, it is the argument that people need knowledge of history in order to have any meaningful knowledge of identity and ways of being human. It is the argument that history is needed for critical perspective. The act of historical selection is an act to recreate one form of human identity, one way of being human in the world, rather than another. We are the stories that we tell. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Sonu Shamdasani's dissection (2006) of Freud's historical self-mythology seems to me a remarkable story of how this process works. Their argument is that the nature, and hence strengths and weaknesses, of psychoanalysis as knowledge are inseparable from the historical stories Freud told about himself and how he brought the knowledge into being.

This recognition of the possibility of different stories is highly relevant to knowing how to state reservations about the universalistic claims sometimes made on behalf of evolutionary and brain science. We do not have to have recourse to vague humanistic notions about natural scientists failing to grasp the essentials of human life. Rather, we can make the precise claim that the natural sciences tell certain kinds of stories, and these stories represent 'the human' in one way rather than another. This representation *constitutes an act of human self-forming*. To the extent that such stories exclude other stories, they exclude other possibilities of self-forming. What the natural science stories often directly exclude is the possibility of telling stories about how the natural sciences themselves have come to tell the kinds of stories they do. This is why historians and sociologists of science matter.



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